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EMPTY CORRIDORS: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
CLOSURE AND SALE OF SURPLUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS
During recent years a substantial drop in the birth rate has
combined with escalating prices for suburban single-family
homes to effect a dramatic decline in enrollment in California
public schools.' Many classrooms built during the population
boom of the 1950's are empty, and with increasing frequency,
school district governing boards are responding to the financial
bind caused by declining enrollment and restrictive school fi-
nance legislation2 by closing and selling public schools.'
When a school is closed and sold, conflicting interests may
come into play. On one side, the school district desires to max-
imize the amount realized from the sale, while on the other
side, the citizens may have an interest in retaining the land in
public use for open space or recreation. A school site which is
sold to a city for open space will command a lower price than
school property which can be developed for commercial or resi-
dential use.4
The comment will focus on two primary issues: (1) whether
a school district is subject to municipal zoning regulations
when it sells school property; and (2) whether taxpayers who
1. According to statistics compiled by the California State Department of Edu-
cation, statewide public school enrollment in grades K-12 peaked in 1970 at 4,457,325.
As of October, 1974, enrollment had declined to 4,295,414, and enrollment is expected
to continue dropping to a projected low of 3,915,221 in 1981. Telephone interview with
Erwin Decker, Ass't to the Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction, February
3, 1976.
2. CAl.. EDuc. CODE § 20902 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
This group of statutes, popularly known as S.B. 90, imposes a ceiling on the
revenue base, so that school districts do not reap the benefit from an increase in the
assessed valuation of local property.
3. According to a survey completed by the California State Department of Edu-
cation December 11, 1975, 143 schools have been closed to their original purpose, and
51 school districts have indicated the expected future closure of 86 schools. Of those
schools which have been closed, 16 schools have been sold, and eight are presently
available for sale. Telephone interview with Erwin Decker, Ass't to the Deputy Super-
intendent of Public Instruction, February 3, 1976.
4. E.g., the price originally sought by the Los Altos School District, Los Altos,
California, for the Hillview school property and Lot 18 (part of the district's former
administration site) was $1,606,500. This price was based on the estimated value of
the school property under RI-10 (residential) zoning and the estimated value of Lot
18 under R-3-1 (commercial) zoning. The property was offered to bidders for a mini-
mum price of $1,004,000 on February 3, 1975. No bids were received. The property was
rezoned to a Public and Community Facilities zone, and in August, 1975, the Hillview
site was purchased by the City of Los Altos for $433,350.
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find the school board's decision to close a school economically
unsound may bring suit against the school district governing
board under California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.1
An analysis of the particular legal problems attending school
closures in the Los Altos School District, Los Altos, California,
will be used to illustrate the difficulties which may occur when
a public school is offered for sale.'
STATUTORY REGULATION OF THE SALE OF SCHOOL PROPERTY
California Education Code section 162011 empowers school
district governing boards to sell unnecessary school property to
any public agency, including a city. The sale may be effected
only by a unanimous resolution of the school board.' The recent
enactment of Assembly Bill 172 by the California Legislature
clarified the law by requiring that surplus school property be
offered first to local agencies for park, recreation, or open space
purposes. The legislature has clearly manifested its intent to
encourage the retention of school property for public use.
Until recently, proceeds from the sale of school property
had to be placed into the school district's capital outlay fund."'
On September 15, 1975, the legislature passed Senate Bill 443,
amending the California Education Code to provide that a
school district with no anticipated need for additional school
construction may deposit sale proceeds into the district's gen-
eral fund."
Some cities are facilitating the retention of surplus school
property for public use by amending the municipal zoning ordi-
nances to include school property in restricted zones. For ex-
ample, subsequent to a resolution by the Los Altos School Dis-
trict governing board to sell one elementary school and a por-
5. CAi.. CIv. PRo. CODE § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
6. Los Altos, which is an affluent suburb, is representative of the type of com-
munity in which school closures are occurring. As the city is substantially developed
and is surrounded by other cities, very little open space remains.
7. CA,.. EDUC. CODE § 16201 (West 1969).
8. Id. § 16203(a).
9. Cal. Stats. (1975), ch. 219 at 502-03.
10. CAL.. EDuc. CODE § 16053 (West 1969). CAL. EDUC. CODE § 16053.5 (West
Supp. 1975), allowing school districts with declining enrollment to deposit sale pro-
ceeds into the general fund, expired June 30, 1975. The capital outlay fund is reserved
for construction and remodeling expenses.
II. Id. § 16053, as amended, Cal. Stats. (1975), ch. 743. The general fund is used
to defray all expenses other than capital improvements, including salaries and sup-
plies.
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tion of a former administration site, the Los Altos City Council
enacted Ordinance No. 75-4, which amended the Los Altos
Municipal Code Zoning Map 2 by placing all schools within the
city limits in a newly-created Public and Community Facilities
District (PCF). Property within the new PCF District may be
used for schools, non-profit recreation areas, golf courses,
churches, museums, and open spacel'-a limitation which sub-
stantially reduces the market value. A second elementary
school within the Los Altos School District is to be closed and
sold in June, 1976, and the school district has made the sale of
the property contingent upon the granting of RI-10 (residen-
tial) zoning. 4
Is A SCHOOL DISTRICT SUBJECT TO MUNICIPAL ZONING
REGULATIONS?
Prior to 1959, when the California Legislature enacted
Government Code sections 53090 through 54095,"1 the law in
California as to the applicability of municipal ordinances to
school districts was well settled by two leading cases, Hall v.
City of Taft"' and Town of Atherton v. Superior Court.'7
In Hall v. City of Taft, " the issue was whether a municipal
corporation's building ordinances were applicable to the con-
struction of a public school building. The contractor, whose
plans had been approved by the State Department of Educa-
tion and the State Division of Architecture, had failed to obtain
a city building permit involving a $300.00 fee. The California
Supreme Court held that "[tlhe public schools of this state
are a matter of statewide rather than local or municipal con-
cern.""' Furthermore, the Hall court held that school districts
are agencies of the state," and that state regulations com-
pletely occupied the field of school construction;' accordingly,
12. Los ALTOS, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10-2.3410 (enacted March, 1975).
13. Id. §§ 10-2.2202 to 10-2.2203.
14. Palo Alto Times, November 5, 1975, at 30, col. 1.
15. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53090-95 (West Supp. 1976). See text accompanying
notes 34-37 infra.
16. 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
17. 159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 324 P.2d 328 (1958); see Note, City Planning: Location
of School Sites: Conflict -With Municipal Zoning Ordinance, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 171
(1959).
18. 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
19. Id. at 179, 302 P.2d at 576.
20. Id. at 181, 302 P.2d at 577.
21. Id. at 184, 302 P.2d at 579.
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a school district could not be subject to local regulations absent
express provision of the state constitution or the legislature.22
Any conflict in authority must be resolved in favor of the
state.' :'
Like the Hall decision, Town of Atherton v. Superior
Court"' was predicated upon the doctrine of preemption. The
Atherton case resolved the issue of the applicability of munici-
pal zoning ordinances to school sites. The Menlo Park School
District, which extended into part of Atherton, initiated an
eminent domain proceeding in order to acquire land for con-
struction of a school. The city sought to block the petition on
the ground that the property in question was zoned for residen-
tial use. The court of appeal followed the rule of the Hall deci-
sion, holding that a school district is an agency of the state"5
and that the state, through comprehensive statutes in the Cali-
fornia Education Code, 8 had preempted the field of school site
selection. 7 It was conceded that the town of Atherton had a
constitutionally-conferred power to zone," but the court con-
cluded that such zoning, as applied to school districts, "is
merely advisory or recommendatory. . . and is not binding on
the school district."2"
A firm tenet of municipal law is Dillon's Rule: a municipal
corporation has only those powers granted to it expressly or by
necessary implication. :"' The Atherton court reaffirmed this
concept, noting that a municipality has no authority to bind
the state or its agencies unless such authority is expressly
granted.:" The court did not find that the legislature had ex-
pressly consented to municipal control of school sites. 2
22. Id. at 183, 302 P.2d at 578.
23. Id. at 189, 302 P.2d at 582.
24. 159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 324 P.2d 328 (1958).
25. Id. at 421, 324 P.2d at 331.
26. CAl. Ewuc. CODE §§ 5021, 5022, 5041 (West 1975); id. § 18102 (West Supp.
1976).
27. The court stated, "The comprehensive system of school control and operation
by the school districts as shown in the statutes . ..is completely inconsistent with
any power of a municipality to control the location of school sites." 159 Cal. App. 2d
at 427, 324 P.2d at 334-335.
28. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 11.
29. 159 Cal. App. 2d at 423, 324 P.2d at 332.
30. Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106 Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1944), citing
.1. DII,,(IN. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911).
31. 159 Cal. App. 2d at 428, 324 P.2d at 335, citing C.J. Kubach Co. v. McGuire,
199 Cal. 215, 217, 248 P.2d 676, 677 (1926).
32. Id.
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The Atherton holding was followed in Landi v. Superior
Court,: ' in which the owners of property condemned for the
expansion of a school site challenged the eminent domain pro-
ceeding on the ground that the property in question was zoned
for residential use. The petitioners' writ was denied on the
basis of the reasoning in Atherton.4
Legislative Response to the Hall and Atherton Cases:
Government Code Sections 53090 through 53095
In 1959, the California Legislature modified the Hall and
Atherton rules by enacting Government Code sections 53090
through 53095.15 Section 53090 defines "local agency" as "an
agency of the State for the local performance of governmental
or proprietary function within limited boundaries." Section
53091 provides that such local agencies must comply with mu-
nicipal building and zoning ordinances, but expressly exempts
school districts from city building ordinances and requires that
they comply with zoning regulations only if the zoning ordi-
nances make provision for the location of public schools. The
pertinent statute as far as school property is concerned is sec-
tion 53094, which authorizes the governing board of a school
district to exempt the district from a city or county zoning
ordinance by a two-thirds vote of the board members except
when the use of the property is for nonclassroom facilities,
including warehouses and automotive storage and repair build-
ings, if such nonclassroom facilities are not adjacent to land
used for a school. A municipality which deems such an action
by a school district to be arbitrary and capricious has the right
to request judicial review of the governing board's decision."
The next question is whether a school district may exercise
its right to disregard a local zoning ordinance and subsequently
sell the property free of zoning restrictions. It is possible that
a court might find the legislature intended to permit school
districts to exempt property only for the purpose of school site
location; but section 53091 alone effectively insures that school
sites may be chosen without regard to zoning regulations.
Thus, unless section 53094 is merely redundant, it must have
been intended to except school districts-as distinguished from
33. 159 Cal. App. 2d 839, 324 P.2d 326 (1958).
34. Id.
35. CAL. GOv'T CODE § 53090-95 (West Supp. 1976).
36. Id. § 53094.
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other local agencies-from municipal control. The nonclass-
room facilities provision is a troublesome factor in this analy-
sis, however. The intent of the provision seems to be to author-
ize local control of the separate location of such unsightly and
traffic-generating facilities as school bus sheds. Some citizens
might find a housing development built on former school prop-
erty at least as unsightly and traffic-generating as school-
support facilities. Also, a decision by a school district to ex-
empt itself from zoning regulations prior to a sale of school
property might well be deemed arbitrary and capricious.
Scope of the Exemption Power
The proper interpretation of Government Code sections
53090 through 53095 was the issue confronted by the California
Court of Appeal in City of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara Unified
School District.:" The Santa Clara Unified School District
sought a use permit to build a continuation school on district-
owned property which was zoned for residential use. The use
permit was denied because of a blanket disapproval of the con-
cept of a continuation school.:" Following the denial of the per-
mit, the school board voted to exempt itself from the zoning
ordinance pursuant to Government Code section 53094. The
city filed suit, contending that the district's action was arbi-
trary and capricious and that section 53094 was unconstitu-
tional. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of section
53094 but found the board's action arbitrary and capricious."
On appeal, the latter holding was reversed."' The court of ap-
peal sustained the right of the school district to exempt itself
from the zoning ordinance and stated that the only reasonable
interpretation of Government Code sections 53091 and 53094 is
that a school district must abide by local zoning ordinances
unless it chooses to exercise its right of exemption, a decision
which the district may make at any time.4' A school district's
discretion is not limited in any way except for the provision forjudicial review if the district's determination to exempt itself
is arbitrary and capricious. 2
37. 22 Cal. App. 3d 152, 99 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1971).
38. Id. at 155, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
39. Id. at 156, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
40. Id. at 163, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
41. Id. at 158, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 216-17.
42. Id.
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The Santa Clara court, in a footnote, cited legislative in-
tent in support of its decision:
Thus, it appears that the Legislature deliberately accorded
different treatment to school districts than to other local
agencies. . . . Sections 53090 through 53095 were primar-
ily designed to insure that other local agencies which were
not subject to such thorough control by the state could not
claim exemption from city and county zoning require-
ments by virtue of the language contained in Hall v. City
of Taft. . . . The Legislature accordingly provided in sec-
tion 53094 that school districts, as opposed to other local
agencies, should retain the right to exempt themselves
from local zoning ordinances."3
There are limits to the sovereign power, however, and
these limits were delineated recently in Board of Trustees of
the California State University and Colleges v. City of Los
Angeles," in which it was held that the state's immunity from
municipal ordinances is limited to situations where the state
acts in its governmental capacity. The court held that when
California State University at Northridge leased land to a cir-
cus, the university was acting in a proprietary rather than a
governmental capacity, and that given the finding that the
state had not preempted the field of circus regulation, the uni-
versity had to comply with the Los Angeles ordinance in ques-
tion ."
There is a strong likelihood a court might find that a school
district which acts in a governmental capacity when it closes a
school is acting in a proprietary capacity when it subsequently
sells the property. Given such a finding, the school district
43. Id. at 158 n.3, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 217 n.3, citing Problems of Local Government
Resulting from the Hall v. Taft Case Decision, 6 ASSEM. INTERIM COMM. REP. No. 8,
MUNICIPAL AND COUNTY GOVERNMENT 7 (1959). But see 56 Op. Arr'Y GEN. 210, 215
(1973), which stated that "the intent [of CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 53090-95 (West Supp.
1976)1 was to restore the previously accepted power of cities and counties to regulate
school districts and similar local public entities within the city or county."
The immunity of state departments other than local agencies from municipal
ordinances remains well established. See In re Means, 14 Cal. 2d 254, 93 P.2d 105
(1939); 50 Op. Arr'v GEN. 210 (1973); 8 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §
25.15, at 45 (3d ed. 1965). This immunity was recently reaffirmed in City of Orange v.
Valenti, 37 Cal. App. 3d 240, 112 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1974), in which a city ordinance was
held inapplicable to the lease of an office building by the Department of Human
Resources for use as an unemployment insurance office.
44. 49 Cal. App. 3d 45, 122 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1975).
45. Id. at 50, 122 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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would be barred from exempting itself from the municipal zon-
ing regulations for the purpose of the sale of surplus property."
The Los Altos School District and the "Public and Community
Facilities" Zone
The Los Altos School District, Los Altos, California,(LASD) provides an example of the conflict which may arise
between city and school district when school property is offered
for sale. On October 7, 1974, the governing board of the Los
Altos School District decided to convert Covington Junior High
School, one of three junior high schools in the LASD, to use
both as an administration and maintenance facility and as an
elementary school. The school board resolved to close Hillview
Elementary School, effective June, 1975, and to sell Hillview
and a portion of Lot 18 (part of the LASD's former administra-
tion site). The LASD, in dividing Lot 18, failed to obtain a
parcel map and city approval pursuant to the Subdivision Map
Act. 7 It was the opinion of County Counsel" that the school
district, as an agency of the state, was exempt from the Subdi-
vision Map Act;4" however, the City Attorney contended that
the LASD must comply with the act and obtain a parcel map.'
In a resolution passed December 1, 1975, the LASD gov-
erning board decided to close and sell another school, Portola
Elementary School, effective June, 1976. The sale of Portola
School was made contingent upon the city granting the parcel
residential (RI-10) zoning." Bids were opened on February 25,
1976, and the school board unanimously accepted the high bid
of $1,175,000 from a real estate developer who plans to build
single-family homes on the site.52 The Los Altos City Council
has announced its intent to preserve the Portola site as open
space; however, the city has no funds available for purchase of
the property." If the City Council fails to rezone the Portola
46. Id.
47. CAi,. Gov'T CODE § 66410 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
48. Interview with Robert Owens, Deputy Santa Clara County Counsel, in Santa
Clara, California, Oct. 16, 1975.
49. CAi,. Gov'T CODE § 66410 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
50. Interview with Anthony Lagorio, Los Altos City Attorney, in Los Altos,
California, Oct. 31, 1975.
51. Palo Alto Times, Feb. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 3.
52. Id.
53. Id., Feb. 19, 1976, at 2, col. 4. The Los Altos City Manager has stated that
the PCF zone is a "pretty big club" and has indicated that the city is considering
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property within 120 days, which course appears likely, the de-
veloper's purchase of the site will be nullified. While the LASD
school board has gone on record as favoring the acquisition of
surplus school property by the city, the implementation of the
district's master plan requires that the district realize the sale
price which could be obtained by selling Portola School under
RI-10 zoning. 4
When the school board first decided to sell Hillview
School, the property was zoned Ri-1055 and could have been
developed as an area of single-family homes. Following the
decision to sell the school, on March 25, 1975, the Los Altos
City Council amended the Los Altos Municipal Code Zoning
Map " and placed all schools within the city limits in the pre-
viously discussed Public and Community Facilities District
(PCF). When the LASD offered the Hillview property for sale,
there were no bidders.5" The school district decided to offer
Hillview to the city, and in August, 1975, the City of Los Altos
purchased the Hillview property for $433,350.00. ' 1 The city uses
the property for recreation purposes and has leased a portion
of the school building to a private school. Had the new PCF
zoning ordinance not prevented the school district from selling
the land for residential development, the market value of the
property would have been much higher.5"
The right of the LASD to exempt Lot 18 and Portola
School from the PCF zone pursuant to Government Code sec-
tion 53094 is not clear. It is probable that both the nonclass-
room facilities clause in section 53904 and the fact that the
means to raise funds to purchase the Portola property. He said that the city and the
school district would have to negotiate a new selling price and that the price should
be well below the developer's offer of $1,175,000. Los Altos Town Crier, Mar. 3, 1976,
at 2, col. 1.
54. Information from the office of the Superintendent, Los Altos School District,
Feb. 10, 1976.
55. Los ALTOS, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10-2.106 (incorporating the zoning map). This
code section was amended in March, 1975, adding § 10-2.3410, which placed schools
in a Public and Community Facilities District.
56. Los ALTOS, CAL., MUN. CODE § 10-2.3410 (enacted March, 1975).
57. The property was offered at a minimum price of $1,004,000, and bids were
due to be opened March 17, 1975. No bids were received by that date. Interview with
clerk, Office of the Superintendent, Los Altos School District, in Los Altos, California,
Feb. 10, 1976.
58. Addendum to Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Real Property between the
Los Altos School District and the City of Los Altos, August 26, 1975 (on file at the
SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
59. See note 4 supra.
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district may be deemed to be acting in a proprietary capacity
will preclude the LASD from exempting itself from the PCF
District zoning for the purpose of selling school property. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible that a court, following the holding in
City of Santa Clara v. Santa Clara Unified School District,' j
would sustain such an exemption. However, some city attor-
neys are of the opinion that once the property has been sold to
a private party, the purchaser would be required to comply
with the city zoning ordinances in any event." Hence there is
some question as to whether a school district in the position of
the LASD can look to the courts for redress.
ARE TAXPAYERS' SUITS AGAINST SCHOOL DISTRICTS PROPER
UNDER CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 526a?
What recourse is available to taxpayers who may challenge
a school district governing board's decision to close a school?
California Code of Civil Procedure section 526a provides in
pertinent part:
An action to obtain a judgment, restraining and
preventing any illegal expenditure of, waste of, or injury to,
the estate, funds, or other property of a county, town, city
or city and county of the state, may be maintained against
any officer thereof, or any agent, or other person, acting inits behalf,. either by a citizen resident therein, or by a
corporation, who is assessed for and is liable to pay, or
within one year before the commencement of the action,
has paid, a tax therein.2
Section 526a expressly establishes a right of action against
cities and counties. Can this section be interpreted as extend-
ing a right of action against school districts? A taxpayers' suit
against the LASD provides an illustration of this issue.
A group of Los Altos citizens contended that the decision
by the governing board of the LASD to close Hillview School
and convert Covington to an elementary school was economi-
cally unsound. Covington Junior High School was the largestjunior high school in the district and had facilities lacking at
the two junior high schools on the periphery of the LASD. The
60. 22 Cal. App. 3d 152, 99 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1971).
61. Interview with Anthony Lagorio, Los Altos City Attorney, in Los Altos,
California, Oct. 31, 1975.
62. CAl.. Civ. PRo. CODE § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
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two smaller junior high schools, Blach and Egan, lack multi-
purpose rooms and swimming pools and have much smaller
libraries than Covington. The cost of converting Covington to
an elementary school coupled with the cost of increasing the
capacity at Blach and Egan Junior High Schools amounted to
a total expenditure of $1,240,000.11 Had the governing board
elected to retain Hillview and Covington Schools and to close
Egan Junior High School, the expenditures incurred would
have amounted to roughly $448,000.11 It was the contention of
a citizens' group called the Los Altos Property Owners that the
LASD governing board's plan involved an unnecessary expend-
iture of $747,000. The Los Altos Property Owners filed suit
against the school district and the governing board seeking an
injunction against the closing of Hillview and the conversion of
Covington." ' The gravamen of the action was that the LASD
decision was ultra vires and amounted to a waste of public
funds. While the designation "ultra vires" normally describes
an action taken by a public body outside the scope of its au-
thority, plaintiffs relied upon Rathbun v. City of Salinas," in
which the court held that the decision of the city to lease part
of a public parking lot to a bank was ultra vires because the
effect of the action was to benefit the bank and to diminish the
use and value of the lot to the city. Plaintiffs contended that
while it is within the scope of the LASD governing board's
power to purchase and sell school sites, the expenditure of
$747,000 without receiving some public benefit is an ultra vires
action. Therefore, plaintiffs argued that they had stated a
cause of action under the rule of Gogarty v. Coachella Valley
Junior College District,7 which permits "[a] taxpayer [to]
sue a governmental body in a representative capacity in cases
involving fraud, collusion, ultra vires, or failure on the part of
the governmental body to perform a duty specifically en-
joined."" The trial court rejected the Los Altos Property Own-
63. Unpublished memorandum by Dean Storkan, counsel for petitioners in Los
Altos Property Owners v. Hutcheon, Civ. No. P 28316 (Santa Clara Super. Ct., Aug.
14, 1975), at 3 (on file at the SANTA CLARA L. REV.).
64. Id.
65. Los Altos Property Owners v. Hutcheon, Civ. No. P 28316 (Santa Clara
Super. Ct., Aug. 14, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 38,366, Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Feb.
25, 1976.
66. 30 Cal. App. 3d 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1973).
67. 57 Cal. 2d 727, 730, 371 P.2d 582, 584, 21 Cal. Rptr. 806, 808 (1962).
68. Id. See Lusk v. Comptom City School Bd. of Educ., 252 Cal. App. 2d 376,
60 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1967).
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ers' argument, stating that in order to establish that an action
is ultra vires, not only must plaintiffs show a lack of public
benefit, but also that there was a private benefit,"' as in
Rathbun v. City of Salinas.'
Alternatively, petitioners contended that they had a cause
of action against the LASD school board for waste of public
funds pursuant to section 526a.71 The issue confronting the trial
court was whether section 526a could be liberally construed to
extend a right of action against school districts. Generally such
a statute would be interpreted strictly, on the theory that had
the legislature intended to include school districts it would
have done so. However, petitioners relied upon the construc-
tion of section 526a in Blair v. Pitchess,2 which involved a
taxpayers' action to enjoin the Los Angeles County Sheriff's
Department from using the remedy of claim and delivery on
the ground that such actions wasted time and constituted an
illegal expenditure of public funds. The California Supreme
Court stated that "California courts have consistently con-
strued section 526a liberally. . . .Indeed, it has been held that
taxpayers may sue state officials to enjoin such officials from
illegally expending state funds."7" The Los Altos Property
Owners argued that a school district is an agency of the state;
accordingly, under Blair, they had a right to sue the LASD and
the governing board for waste of public funds pursuant to sec-
tion 526a. The trial judge declined to rule favorably on the
applicability of section 526a to school districts absent an appel-
late ruling to that effect.7" The Los Altos Property Owners have
filed an appeal seeking judicial determination that section 526a
applies to school districts.".
There is a case which appears to be dispositive of the issue
of the applicability of section 526a to school districts. Duskin
69. Los Altos Property Owners v. Hutcheon, Civ. No. P 28316 (Santa ClaraSuper. Ct., Aug. 14, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 38,366, Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Feb.
25, 1976.
70. 30 Cal. App. 3d 199, 106 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1973).
71. CAL.. CiV. Pao. CODE § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
72. 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
73. Id. at 269, 486 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 49, citing California State
Employees' Ass'n v. Williams, 7 Cal. App. 3d 390, 86 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970), and
Ahlgren v. Carr, 209 Cal. App. 2d 248, 25 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1962).
74. Los Altos Property Owners v. Hutcheon, Civ. No. P 28316 (Santa ClaraSuper. Ct., Aug. 14, 1975), appeal docketed, Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., Feb. 25, 1976.
75. Los Altos Property Owners v. Hutcheon, No. 38,366, Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist.,
Feb. 25, 1976.
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SURPLUS PUBLIC SCHOOLS
v. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency7" involved a
taxpayers' action against a state redevelopment agency based
on the disposition of public property at a price far below the
fair value requirement. The taxpayers contended that such an
action was ultra vires and sued under section 526a. The San
Francisco Redevelopment Agency demurred to the complaint
on the ground that no cause of action could be stated under
section 526a because that statute limits taxpayers' actions to
suits against officers and agents of cities and counties, and the
respondent agency is an administrative arm of the state of
California, not a local agency of the City and County of San
Francisco. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's order
sustaining the demurrer:
Although, strictly speaking, the officers of the Redevelop-
ment Agency are not state officials, the individual respon-
dents are nevertheless officials of an agency created by
state law. . . .Thus, the rationale in Blair v. Pitchess
would clearly be applicable. . . . It follows that the
Agency's general demurrer could not be properly sustained
on the basis of Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.11
That a school district is an agency of the state was clearly
established in Hall v. City of Taft" and Town of Atherton v.
Superior Court,7" which are still good law despite modification
by the California Government Code sections previously dis-
cussed."" The Duskin case should establish the right of a tax-
payers' group such as the Los Altos Property Owners to bring
an action against a school board under section 526a.
CONCLUSION
Legal problems attending the sale of public schools will
likely be a growing area of concern in California."' Because sale
of a school site'may be considered a proprietary activity and
because surplus school property would most likely not be used
for classroom facilities after sale, it is improbable that a school
district could avail itself of the provisions in the exemption
76. 31 Cal. App. 3d 769, 107 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1973).
77. Id. at 773-74, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 670, following Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258,
486 P.2d 1242, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1971).
78. 47 Cal. 2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 (1956).
79. 159 Cal. App. 2d 417, 324 P.2d 328 (1958).
80. C i,. GOV'T CODE §§ 53090-95 (West Supp. 1976).
81. See notes I & 3 supra.
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statute"2 when it sells a former school site. However, taxpayers
should have standing under section 526a 3 to challenge a school
closing if the facts evince evidence of waste, fraud, or an ultra
vires action.
Patricia Paulson White
82. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 53094 (West Supp. 1976).
83. CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 526a (West Supp. 1976).
